CHINA'S NATIONAL CHAMPIONS: GOVERNANCE CHANGE
THROUGH GLOBALIZATION?
Li-Wen Lin*
China is regarded as the world’s leading practitioner of state
capitalism in which important capitalist enterprises have a close
relationship with the state. One prominent feature of China’s state
capitalism is the fundamental role of about 100 large state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) controlled by organs of the central government in
critical industries such as oil, telecom, and transportation. These SOEs
are often dubbed “China’s national champions.” They are not only
important players in China’s domestic economy but also major
contributors to China’s fast-growing global investment. Their global
expansion however often encounters political and regulatory challenges
abroad, partly because their corporate governance practices are opaque
and often deviant from international standards. Prevailing theories
suggest that political and regulatory pressure arising from institutional
distance between China and host countries (particularly advanced
economies such as the United States) may act as an effective force to push
for SOE governance change. Empirical findings in this Article however
indicate that the development of global equity connections that potentially
expose SOEs to foreign institutional pressure seems virtually irrelevant to
the reform patterns of these most important non-financial SOEs in China.
The absence of correlation may be related to investment structure and
geography, investment motives, and importantly, China’s domestic
political institutions. This Article offers insights into the perennial
scholarly debate about the future of national corporate governance
systems in the era of globalization and also provides practical
recommendations for Chinese and international policymakers
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I.
Introduction
The downfall of Eastern European socialism and the softening of
Chinese communism in the 1980s appeared to conclusively declare a
victory of free market capitalism. The victory however turns out to be
rather uncertain as the twenty-first century unfolds. The financial crisis in
2008 unabashedly disgraced liberal capitalism. The U.S. economy, the
champion of free market, even resorted to government ownership for relief.
Meanwhile, as noted in the Economist, “[t]he crisis of Western liberal
capitalism has coincided with the rise of a powerful new form of [state]
capitalism in emerging markets,”1 frequently described as state capitalism.
It is now often, albeit subject to debate, characterized as “a system in
which governments use state-owned companies and investment vehicles to
dominate market activity.”2
China is regarded as the world’s leading practitioner of state
capitalism. One prominent feature of China’s state capitalism is the
fundamental role of about 100 large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
under the central government’s control in “critical industries such as oil,
steel, telecom, and transportation.” 3 These SOEs are often dubbed
“China’s national champions.” Many of them, including China National
Petroleum Corporation and China Mobile Communications Corporation,
are Fortune Global 500 companies (the world’s largest 500 companies by
1

Adrian Woolridge, The Visible Hand, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21542931.
2
Ian Bremmer & Devin T. Stewart, China’s State Capitalism Poses Ethical Challenges,
ASIA
TIMES,
Aug.
17,
2010,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/
LH17Cb01.html.
3
Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 725 (2013).
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revenues). 4 These SOEs are not only prominent companies in China’s
domestic economy, but also active players in the field of global
investment. At present, China is the third largest country, behind the
United States and Japan, with respect to outward foreign direct investment
(FDI) flow. 5 Notably, a massive portion of China’s outward FDI is
contributed by the national champions.6
In recent years, Chinese SOEs’ global expansion has aroused
great controversies in host countries. State ownership often raises the
specter of undue government influence in SOE management, which may
pose threats to the host country’s national interests. This concern is
exacerbated by the fact that Chinese SOEs have low transparency and
their actual corporate governance practices usually deviate from
international standards. In response, some host countries including
Australia, Canada and the United States have welcomed Chinese SOEs
with great caution through (usually politicized) regulatory reviews.7 Often,
the regulators scrutinize the acquiring SOE’s corporate governance quality
and sometimes may condition their approval by requiring the SOE to
adopt certain governance practices.8
As China’s national champions continue to globalize, it raises
important questions about how their governance would change in the face
of mounting political and regulatory pressure in host countries.
Specifically speaking, can exposure to international environments serve as
an effective mechanism for Chinese national champions to learn and
converge on prevailing international corporate governance practices? Do
foreign investment regulatory regimes in the United States and other
countries play any significant role in modernizing governance practices of
Chinese SOEs?
Does Chinese SOEs’ global expansion through
subsidiaries or other channels diffuse any positive effects back to their
parent companies headquartered in Beijing?
The pursuit of these questions will shed some light on the
perennial scholarly debate about the trajectory of national corporate
governance systems in the age of globalization. It will also make an
interdisciplinary contribution. Researchers of international business
4

Id.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2014 – Investing
in the SDGs: An Action Plan, 7, UNCTAD/WIR/2014, (June 24, 2014),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf [hereinafter World Investment
Report 2014].
6
See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, REPORT ON CHINA’S
OUTWARD INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION 2011-2012, at 117 (reporting that
70.5% of China’s FDI flow was contributed by the SOEs controlled by the central
government; also see Section II for more detailed information discussing the role of
China’s National Champions).
7
See Section III (analyzing the regulatory challenges abroad).
8
See infra Table 2 (discussing major countries that have a regulatory system of foreign
investment).
5
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typically focus on how corporate governance structures including
ownership structure, 9 board composition, 10 top management team, 11 and
executive compensation12 influence a firm’s internationalization strategies.
Little attention has been paid to the flipside of this research inquiry,
namely how the investing firm located in the home country may change its
governance practices as a result of internationalization. 13 This Article
attempts to fill this void by investigating Chinese national champions’
government reform pattern in the course of globalization. Beyond
scholarly contributions, this Article has practical policy implications. It
provides a better understanding of whether and how to utilize
globalization to improve the SOE reform in China. Moreover, it provides
better knowledge for international investors and regulators as to how to
implement foreign investment regulations to develop mutually beneficial
relationships with China’s SOEs.
This Article draws on network and institutional theories in
sociology, the approaches commonly adopted in relevant international
business studies, to hypothesize the relationship between international
investment and governance reform patterns of the 100 or so non-financial
SOEs under the Chinese central government’s control. It predicts that
outward investment will create inward influence on SOE governance,
especially when the SOE invests in a foreign regime that has much higher
corporate governance standards than its home regime, and the degree of
influence is mediated through different investment structures. This
theoretical thinking however seems to have limited explanatory power for
Chinese national champions. The empirical findings in this Article
indicate that international exposure to strong corporate governance
regimes and investment regulatory systems hostile to foreign SOEs (e.g.
Australia, Canada and the United States) appears virtually irrelevant to the
reform patterns of these most important non-financial SOEs in China.
9

Gabriel R. G. Benito et al., Distant Encounters of the Third Kind: Multinational
Companies Locating Divisional Headquarters Abroad, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 373, 373
(2011); Sumon Kumar Bhaumik et al., Does Ownership Structure of Emerging-Market
Firms Affect Their Outward FDI? The Case of the Indian Automotive and Pharmaceutical
Sectors, 41 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 437, 437 (2009).
10
Igor Filatotchev & Mike Wright, Agency Perspectives on Corporate Governance of
Multinational, Enterprises, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 471, 471 (2011); Yung-Chih Lien et al., The
Role of Corporate Governance in FDI Decisions: Evidence from Taiwan, 14 INT’L BUS.
REV. 739, 739 (2005).
11
Laszlo Tihanyi et al, Composition of the Top Management Team and Firm International
Diversification, 26 J. MGMT. 1157, 1157 (2000).
12
WM. Gerard Sanders & Mason A. Carpenter, Internationalization and Firm
Governance: The Roles of CEO Compensation, Top Team Composition, and Board
Structure, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 158, 158 (1998).
13
See Nai H. Wu & Laszlo Tihanyi, Corporate Governance, Multinational Firms, and
Internationalization, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Mar. 2013, at 449464 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013) (noting that extant research on multinational firms
unfortunately has limited integration with corporate governance).
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This Article offers a number of possible explanations for the absence of
correlation between internationalization and governance reform. Among
other reasons, investment structures and investment geography pose
obstacles to transmitting positive governance effects back to the (ultimate)
parent SOEs. Moreover, SOE governance reform is a result more of the
Chinese government’s central planning than market behavior decided at
the firm level. The popular hypothesis that internationalization leads to
governance reform is founded on market-driven logic, and it does not
apply well to the SOEs that are deeply embedded in the state system.
This Article is organized as follows. Section II provides an
overview of the organizational structure of China’s national champions
and their magnitude in China’s globalization scheme.
Their
organizational structure forms a corporate network through which
influence may possibly be transmitted. In Section III, this Article reviews
foreign investment regulations in some major countries and recent
controversial investments involving Chinese SOEs. The review identifies
which regulatory jurisdictions may pose institutional pressure on Chinese
SOEs in their course of globalization. Section IV hypothesizes how
globalization through international investment may influence an investing
SOE’s governance practices based on the popular assumption that firms
are responsive to international market and institutional disparity pressure.
Section V offers preliminary empirical evidence concerning the 113 nonfinancial SOEs under the Chinese central government’s control as of the
end of 2013. Section VI discusses scholarly and policy implications.
Section VII finally concludes with questions for future research.
II.

Globalizing China’s National Champions

China is not only a major recipient of FDI but also has become a
significant FDI source. China’s outward FDI flow (excluding Hong Kong)
increased from $2.3 billion in 2000 to $101 billion in 2013, ranking as the
country with the third largest outward FDI flow in the world, behind the
United States and Japan. 14 This astonishing growth in outward FDI is
mainly contributed by the government’s “going global” policy, formally
launched in 2000, which encourages Chinese firms to invest aboard.
Under this policy, the Chinese government provides financial and
diplomatic resources, particularly for SOEs to go on a shopping spree
acquiring prominent companies and valuable assets worldwide.15
14

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting
Linkages,
298,
UNCTAD/WIF/2001,
(Sept.
17,
2001),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2001_en.pdf; World Investment Report 2014, supra note 5, at
205.
15
It has been estimated that 95-97% of the outward foreign investment lending provided
by the policy banks in China went to the SOEs. See Amos Irwin & Keven P. Gallagher,
Exporting National Champions: China’s OFDI Finance in Comparative Perspective (B.U.
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As of 2013, wholly government-owned SOEs accounted for
55.2% of China’s non-financial outward investment stock.16 It has been
estimated that SOEs of all kinds, including wholly- and partially-state
controlled, contributed approximately 85-90% of China’s outward FDI.17
A vast majority of China’s top 100 companies by outward FDI stock and
flow are SOEs wholly owned by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration (SASAC), the central government’s ownership agency.
Table 1 below shows a list of the top twenty non-financial Chinese firms
by outward investment stock as of 2012. All the top twenty contributors
are SOEs owned by SASAC.18
Table 1: Top 20 Non-Financial Chinese Enterprises by Outward Investment
19
Stock, 2012
Rank

Name of Enterprise

Industry

Ownership

1

China Petrochemical Corporation
(Sinopec)

Petroleum

SOE under
SASAC

2

China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC)

Petroleum

SOE under
SASAC

3

China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC)

Petroleum

SOE under

Global Econ. Governance Initiative, Working Paper No. 6, 2014) (discussing the financial
role of the state in relation to China’s outward foreign direct investment).
16
2013 Niandu Zhongguo Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Tongji Gongbao (2013 年度中国对外直接
投资统计公报) [2013 Statistical Bulletin Of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics, and State
Administration of Foreign Exchange of People’s Republic of China, Sept. 9, 2014),
http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjzl/jwtz/201409/1838257_1.html.
Note that in the
government’s report, state-owned enterprises refer to those 100% owned by the
government; it does not include partially state-owned SOEs.
17
Limin Zhang, Wenbu Tisheng Guoyou Qiye de Guojihua Jingying Nengli (稳步提升国
有 企 业 的 国 际 化 经 营 能 力 ) [Steadily Improving SOEs’ International Management
Capability], CHINA ECON. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A05 (noting that the official
government’s report underestimated the SOE’s share in outward FDI because it does not
account for partially-owned SOEs and according to KPMG’s data, SOEs accounted for
88% of China’s overseas mergers and acquisitions for the period of 2009-2011; therefore
reporting estimate that SOEs should account for 85%-90% of China’s outward FDI stock).
18
2012 Nian Zhongguo Fei Jinrong Lei Kuaguo Gongsi 100 Qiang (An 2012 Nianmo
Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Cunliang Paixu) (2012 年中国非金融类跨国公司 100 强(按 2012 年
末 对 外 直 接 投 资 存 量 排 序 )) [The Top 100 China’s Non-Financial Multinational
Companies in 2012 (Arranged by Direct Outward Investment Stock)] (promulgated by the
Ministry
of
Commerce,
Sept.
16,
2013),
http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjzl/jwtz/201309/1775847_1.html.
19
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 2012 STATISTICAL BULLETIN
OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI.
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4

China Mobile Communication
Corporation

Telecom

SOE under
SASAC

5

Chin Resources (Holdings) Co., Ltd.

Diversified

SOE under
SASAC

6

China Ocean Shipping (Group)
Company (COSCO)

Transportation

SOE under
SASAC

7

Aluminum Corporation of China

Metal

SOE under
SASAC

8

Sinochem Corporation

Chemical

SOE under
SASAC

9

China Merchant Group

Diversified

SOE under
SASAC

10

China State Construction Engineering
Corporation

Construction

SOE under
SASAC

11

China Unicom Corporation

Telecom

SOE under
SASAC

12

China Minmetals Corporation

Metal

SOE under
SASAC

13

China National Chemical Corporation

Chemical

SOE under
SASAC

14

CITIC Group

Diversified

SOE under
SASAC

15

China National Cereals, Oils &
Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO)

Food

SOE under
SASAC

16

China National Aviation Holding
Corporation

Transportation

SOE under
SASAC

17

State Grid Corporation of China

Utility

SOE under
SASAC

18

SinoSteel Corporation

Metal

SOE under
SASAC

19

China Three Gorges Corporation

Utility

SOE under
SASAC

20

Sinotrans & CSC Holdings Co., Ltd.

Logistics

SOE under
SASAC
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At present, there are 112 SOEs under SASAC’s control. These
SOEs are recognized as China’s national champions. They are organized
as vertically integrated corporate groups. Each corporate group has a
holding company standing at the top of the ownership hierarchy. The
holding company is 100% owned by SASAC. All the companies reported
in Table 1 are the holding company of a state-owned corporate group.
Each holding company controls a large number of subsidiaries including
listed companies, finance companies, research institutes, and many other
related firms along the production chain.20
It has been noted that the holding company has many governance
features that diverge from prevailing international standards. 21 For
instance, at the time of this writing, only about half of the 112 holding
companies have successfully established a board of directors. SASAC and
the Organization Department (i.e. the human resources department) of the
Chinese Communist Party exercise the power of appointing top managers
of the holding companies. “Political qualities,” including loyalty to the
Chinese Communist Party, are among the major criteria of managerial
performance evaluation.22 The holding companies’ close connection with
the government obviously raises concerns in host countries. Even if a
holding company utilizes a listed subsidiary as an investment vehicle, it
may not shed governance doubts because the holding company often is the
absolute majority shareholder of the listed subsidiary.23 As shown in the
following section, regulators in some advanced economies including
Australia, Canada, and the United States have frustrated several potential
20
Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 710-711 fig.1 (2013).
Figure 1 in Lin & Milhaupt’s article well illustrates the organizational structure:
Chinese Communist Party
(exercising shadow control rights)

State Council
SASAC
(exercising rights
as an investor)
100%

Holding Company
(core company in the group)
>50%

>50%
Other National
or Provincial
Corporate
Groups

>50%

>50%

Major Subsidiaries Finance Other
Research
(publicly traded) Company Subsidiaries Institutes
Subsidiaries

Noneconomic
Institutions
(universities,
etc.)

Group Boundary

21

Id. at 752.
Zhongyang Qiye Lingdao Banzi He Lingdao Renyuan Zonghe Kaohe Pingjia Banfa
(Shixing) ( 中 央 企 业 领 导 班 子 和 领 导 人 员 综 合 考 核 评 价 办 法 ( 试 行 )) [Measures
Concerning the Integrated Evaluation of the Top Management Teams and Managers of the
Central Enterprises (Provisional)] (promulgated by the Org. Dep’t Communist Party of
China, Nov. 6, 2009), http://gzw.xinjiang.gov.cn/10050/10090/10012/2010/19547.htm.
23
Erica Downs, China’s NOCs: Lessons Learned from Adventures Abroad,
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 2008, at 30,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2008/7/chinadowns/07_china_downs.pdf. (arguing that foreign investors cannot differentiate the
holding and the listed subsidiary as the holding controls an absolute majority).
22
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takeovers by Chinese SOEs. In the face of legitimacy challenges, do
China’s national champions change their governance practices as they
globalize? Do the regulatory regimes in some host countries exert any
effective influence on the governance reform of China’s national
champions?
III.

Regulatory Challenges Abroad

Host countries are usually ambivalent toward FDI. On the one
hand, FDI is perceived desirable as it promotes economic development.
On the other hand, a foreign investor may favor the interests of its home
country or parent company to the detriment of national interests of the
host country. To balance economic benefits and national interest concerns,
many countries have regulatory regimes to scrutinize investment by
foreign entities. Table 2 below shows a list of major countries that have a
regulatory system of foreign investment.
Table 2: Comparison of Foreign Investment Regulatory Regimes
Country

Australia

Sources of
Law and
Responsible
Regulator
Foreign
Acquisitions
and
Takeover
Act 1975
(FETA);
Foreign
Acquisitions
and
Takeover
Regulations
1989;
Australia’s
Foreign
Investment
Policy
(AFIP).
Treasurer;
Foreign
Investment
Review
Board
(FIRB).

24

Key
Concerns
“National
interest”
including
national
security,
competition,
other
Australian
Government
Policies
(including
tax), impact
on the
economy and
the
community,
character of
the investor.

Corporate
Governance as
an Explicit
Factor in Review
When considering
“the character of
the investor”, the
government
considers “the
corporate
governance
practices of
foreign investors.”
(AFIP)

24

Special Regulation
for Foreign SOEs

High-Profiled
Troubled Cases
against Chinese SOEs

All foreign
government investors
must notify the
Government and get
prior approval before
making a direct
investment in
Australia, regardless
of the value of the
investment.

Minmetals/ OZ
Minerals (2009):
approval conditioned
on excluding the
Prominent Hill mine,
based on national
security as it is located
close to a sensitive
military zone in the
deserts of outback
South Australia.

Where a proposal
involves a foreign
government investor,
the Government
considers if the
investment is
commercial in nature
or if the investor may
be pursuing broader
political or strategic
objectives that may
be contrary to
Australia’s national
interest. This
includes assessing
whether the
prospective
investor’s
governance

Chinalco/Rio Tino
(2009): as the
international
commodity markets
greatly improved
during the prolonged
regulatory approval
process, Rio Tino
unilaterally ended the
deal one week before
the regulator’s meeting
to decide on the deal.

Information about the regulations in France, Germany and Japan is from United States
Government Accountability Office, Laws and Policies Regulating Foreign Investment in
10 Countries, (Feb, 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08320.pdf.
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arrangements could
facilitate actual or
potential control by a
foreign government.
(AFIP)

Canada

Investment
Canada Act
1985;
Regulations
Respecting
Investment
in Canada;
National
Security
Review of
Investments
Regulations.

“Net benefit”
to Canada
(including
economic
impact) and
national
security

Industry
Canada;
Canadian
Heritage.

USA

Exon-Florio
Amendment
to the
Defense
Production
Act of 1950,
as
Amended;
Guidance
Concerning
the National
Security
Review
Conducted
by the
Committee
on Foreign
Investment
in the United
States

National
Security

The Foreign
Investment
and National
Security Act
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When assessing
whether a deal is
of net benefit to
Canada, the
Minister will
examine the
corporate
governance and
reporting structure
of the nonCanadian. This
examination will
include whether
the non-Canadian
adheres to
Canadian
standards of
corporate
governance
(including, for
example,
commitments to
transparency and
disclosure,
independent
members of the
board of directors,
independent audit
committees and
equitable
treatment of
shareholders), and
to Canadian laws
and practices,
including
adherence to free
market principles.
(The SOE
Guidelines)
When evaluating
transactions by
foreign
governmentcontrolled entities,
CFIUS considers,
among other
factors, “whether
governance
structures are in
place to ensure
independence.”
(The CFIUS
Guidance)

“Guidelines on
Investment by StateOwned Enterprises”
(The SOE
Guidelines, first
issued in 2007;
amended in 2012)
The Minister will
assess whether a
Canadian business to
be acquired by a nonCanadian that is an
SOE will likely
operate on a
commercial basis,
including with regard
to: where to export;
where to process; the
participation of
Canadians in its
operations in Canada
and elsewhere;
the impact of the
investment on
productivity and
industrial efficiency
in Canada; support of
on-going innovation,
research and
development in
Canada; and the
appropriate level of
capital expenditures
to maintain the
Canadian business in
a globally
competitive position.
In reviewing foreign
governmentcontrolled
transactions, CFIUS
considers, among all
other relevant facts
and circumstances,
the extent to which
the basic investment
management policies
of the investor
require investment
decisions to be based
solely on commercial
grounds; the degree
to which, in practice,
the investor’s
management and
investment decisions
are exercised
independently from
the controlling
government,
including whether
governance

CNOOC/Nexen
(2012): approval
conditioned on
CNOOC’s
commitment to some
undertakings including
listing CNOOC on the
Toronto Stock
Exchange.

CNOOC/Unocal
(2005): CNOOC
withdrew its bid in the
midst of intensive
political opposition
played out in Congress
and dissatisfaction
with the CFIUS review
process; its competing
bidder, Chevron, won
the deal at the end.
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structures are in
place to ensure
independence; the
degree of
transparency and
disclosure of the
purpose, investment
objectives,
institutional
arrangements, and
financial information
of the investor; and
the degree to which
the investor complies
with applicable
regulatory and
disclosure
requirements of the
countries in which
they invest. (The
CFIUS Guidance)

Committee
on Foreign
Investment
in the United
States
(CFIUS).

EU

Currently
there is no
foreign
investment
review at the
EU level.

None

None

None

None

France

Law 20041343;
Decree
2005-1739

Public order,
public safety,
national
Defense

None

None

None

Germany

2004
Amendment
to
1961Foreign
Trade and
Payments
Act.

Ensure
essential
security
interests,
prevent
disturbance
of peaceful
international
coexistence
or foreign
relations

None

None

None

Japan

1991
Amendment
to the
Foreign
Exchange
and Foreign
Trade Act of
1949.

National
security,
public order,
public safety,
or the
economy

None

None

None

While each country has unique characteristics in its own system to
regulate foreign investment, in many ways the systems are quite similar to
each other. Although the regulatory scope varies significantly, regulations
that restrict foreign investment are generally based on national security.
For instance, Australia, Canada, and Japan also formally include economic
concerns as part of the criteria for foreign investment reviews. At present,
there is no foreign investment regulation at the EU level, but there are
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some variations among European countries. France and Germany have
regulatory reviews based on national security, whereas countries including
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, and the
Netherlands (not shown in Table) do not have any investment regulations
related to national security interests.25
Australia, Canada and the United States probably have the most
detailed regulations and relatively active records in coping with
investment by foreign SOEs. In Australia, all investments by foreign
government-controlled entities are subject to regulatory review, regardless
the size of the investment.26 Investments by other entities are reviewable
only when the transaction involves certain sectors and are above a certain
monetary threshold.27
In Canada, the regulatory regime operates under the Investment
Canada Act.28 When a foreign investor acquires control of a Canadian
business and the asset value of the Canadian business being acquired
equals or exceeds a certain threshold, the foreign investor must prove that
the investment is of net benefit to Canada.29 In 2007, Industry Canada
promulgated the SOE Guidelines under the Act partly as a reaction to
growing public concerns over foreign SOEs’ acquisition of controlling
stakes in prominent Canadian businesses. 30 In 2009, the Investment
Canada Act was amended to allow the government to block foreign
investments based on national security concerns.31 Recently, in 2012, the
Canadian government further revised the SOE Guidelines and increased
scrutiny, along with the announcement of approving the contentious
acquisitions by Petronas and CNOOC.32 The latest guidelines broaden the
definition of SOE, covering any “enterprise that is owned, controlled or
influenced, directly or indirectly by a foreign government.”33
In the United States, parties to a transaction that could result in
control of a U.S. business by a foreign person may file a notice with the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to
determine whether such transaction would present any national security
risks. As stated in the CFIUS Guidance, foreign government control is
obviously an important factor though it does not necessarily, in itself, pose
25

Angela Huyue Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility, 34
NORTHWESTERN J. INT’L L. & BUS. 395, 433 (2014).
26
Australia’s
Foreign
Investment
Policy
2015,
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/_downloads/Australias_Foreign_Investment_Policy_June_
2015.pdf.
27
Id.
28
Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28.
29
Investment Canada Act Guidelines – Investment by State-Owned Enterprises,
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html#p2.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
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a national security risk. 34 Other factors such as whether appropriate
corporate governance structure is in place to ensure the investing entity’s
independence of the foreign government shall be considered as well. 35
Similar to the United States, both Australia and Canada include corporate
governance structure, among other things, as an important concern.36
In recent years, a number of prominent Chinese SOEs have
encountered regulatory challenges in Australia, Canada, and the United
States. Loosely defined regulatory concepts, including national security
and interests in foreign investment regulations, provide ample political
space to galvanize public debate in the host country. For instance, in 2005,
CNOOC Limited (a listed subsidiary of an oil SOE under SASAC’s
control) attempted to acquire Unocal, a U.S. oil producer. The CNOOCUnocal deal faced unprecedented political opposition by the U.S.
Congress based on the claims that the takeover would threaten US national
security. Congress, through its legislative power, significantly dragged the
CFIUS review process. The politicized regulatory review process
eventually forced CNOOC to retreat from the bidding war and the
American-owned Chevron Corporation won the deal.37
The Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal in Australia faced a similar challenge.
In 2009, Chinalco, one of the SOEs under SASAC, planned to acquire an
18% stake of Anglo-Australian mining giant, Rio Tinto. But the
regulatory process was prolonged in the debate of the consequences of
giving Chinese SOEs access to an enormous trove of natural resources in
Australia. Rio Tinto unilaterally terminated the deal just days before
Australian regulators were expected to impose tough conditions for their
approval of it.38 Another prominent case in Australia was the sale of OZ
Minerals to China Minmetals Non Ferrous Metals Co., Ltd (Minmetals), a
subsidiary of China Minmetals Corporation. China Minmetals Corporation
is a central SOE under SASAC’s control. The Australian government
announced that it would not approve the transaction if it included the
Prominent Hill operation based on national security concerns. A
subsequent agreement was reached whereby Minmetals would purchase
OZ Minerals assets except for Prominent Hill.39

34

Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS, 73 Fed. Reg.
74567, 74571 (Dec. 8, 2008).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., US-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: RISING TIDE, RISING
STAKES, ch. 5 (2006).
38
Dana Cimilluca et al., Rio Tinto Scuttles Its Deal with Chinalco, WALL ST. J., June 5,
2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124411140142684779.
39
Peter Smith, Oz Minerals Shareholders Accept Minmetals Bid, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9056355a-559f-11de-ab7e00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rOmaygK9.
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Recently, CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen also aroused great
public concerns in Canada. After a delayed review process, the Canadian
government finally approved the deal with conditions including requiring
CNOOC’s listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange. These conditions were
meant to ensure that CNOOC's corporate governance and transparency
were in compliance with Canadian standards.40
An overview of the foreign investment laws shows that a foreign
SOE’s relation with the government in its home country is the root of
regulatory concerns. Does a foreign SOE act as an independent enterprise
for commercial interests or as an agent of the foreign government pursuing
political interests? Regulatory regimes often consider whether adequate
corporate governance structure is in place to shield the SOE management
from interference by its home country government. If a foreign SOE’s
governance structure demonstrates independence of its home country
government, the SOE will be more likely to obtain regulatory approval
and public support in the host country. It suggests that the regulatory
regimes scrutinizing investment by foreign SOEs may act as a potential
mechanism to change investing foreign SOEs’ corporate governance. The
following section proposes a framework to analyze how institutional
environments including corporate governance and foreign investment
regulatory institutions in the host country may affect the governance of
foreign SOEs. Based on this analytical framework, this Article will make
hypotheses regarding whether globalization through foreign investment
and overseas listing may prompt Chinese national champions to change
their corporate governance practices.

IV.

Theoretical Framework of Globalization and Governance
Change

Relevant international business studies have investigated how
institutional distance between the home country and the host country
would affect a firm’s entry modes and subsequent performance of the
investment vehicle in the host country. 41 This body of literature often
draws on sociological theories to explain institutional disparity between
the home country and the host country as an important determinant of a
40

Shawn Mccarthy and Steven Chase, Ottawa Approves Nexen, Progress Foreign
Takeover, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globeinvestor/ottawa-approves-nexen-progress-foreign-takeovers/article6107548/.
41
Majid Abdi & Preet S. Aulakh, Do Country-Level Institutional Frameworks and
Interfirm Governance Arrangements Substitute or Complement in International Business
Relationships? 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 477, 477 (2012); Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, State
Ownership Effect on Firms’ FDI Ownership Decisions under Institutional Pressure: A
Study of Chinese Outward-Investing Firms, 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 264, 264 (2012); Klaus
E Meyer et al., Overcoming Distrust: How State-Owned Enterprises Adapt Their Foreign
Entries to Institutional Pressures Abroad, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1005, 1020 (2014).
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firm’s strategy to enter the foreign country. Existing literature, however,
has paid little attention to how a company’s outward investment would
create inbound influence on the company itself. This inattention is
explainable as the dominant players in the global investment market have
traditionally been firms in advanced economies. Firms in advanced
economies have little reason to emulate immature institutions in less
developed countries. But the emergence of multinational firms from
China and other developing countries calls for an evaluation of any effects
in the reverse direction. Following similar sociological thoughts in the
international business literature, this Article uses network analysis and
institutional theories in economic sociology to build an analytical
framework of how a firm may change its corporate governance practices
due to institutional pressure faced in the host country. This Article will
apply this framework to hypothesize how “going global” may influence
Chinese national champions’ governance practices.
Sociological network analysis is based on a fundamental
assumption that interactions between social actors (whether individuals,
organizations, or nations) shape their behavior. Social actors are viewed
as interdependent, linking with one another by social ties through which
information and other resources are channeled.42 For instance, firms may
be linked with one another though ownership ties (i.e. holding shares in
another firm) or interlocking directorships (i.e. two firms sharing a
common director). Material and non-material resources may flow through
the concrete relationships and influence behavior or outcomes. Rich
sociological evidence shows that inter-firm networks play an important
role in sharing risks and diffusing information.43
From a sociological network perspective, foreign investment is
relational in the sense that it creates not only flows of money, but also
channels of influence. The relational nature of investment becomes
particularly complex for overseas investment across different institutional
environments. Institutional theory in economic sociology suggests that an
organization’s behavior is influenced by the economic, legal and political
environment in which it operates.44 This environment creates normative
forces that drive how an organization should operate, regardless of
whether a particular normative practice is useful to the organization’s
functioning.
Conformity to institutional expectations helps the
42

Mak Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 481 (1985).
43
For a summary of this body of sociological literature, see generally Joel M. Podolny &
Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 57, 57 (1998).
44
For the seminal work of institutional theory in sociology, see generally Paul J. DiMaggio
& Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective
Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983); John W. Meyer
& Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,
83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977).
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organization acquire legitimacy. Different environments impose different
normative pressures and thus produce different organizational structures
and behavior. When an organization born of and operating in a certain
environment enters a new environment, it may be under normative
pressure to change its organizational structures or behavior so as to adapt
to and establish legitimacy in the new environment. The normative
pressure may be more intense when the new environment is dissimilar
from the original environment.45
As different countries have different institutional environments,
this relational and institutional approach suggests that the potential of a
SOE’s corporate governance change depends on the institutional disparity
between the SOE’s origin country and its investment destination country.
In other words, institutional distance between the origin country and the
destination country of investment matters in evaluating the potential of
SOE governance change.
While there are many dimensions of
institutional environments, this Article focuses on corporate governance
institutions, which are a main concern in foreign investment reviews.
Table 3 below illustrates the basic idea.
Table 3: Institutional Distance and the Potential of SOE Governance Change
Destination Country
Strong Corporate
Governance Regime
Origin
Country

Strong
Corporate
Governance
Regime

Weak
Corporate
Governance
Regime

45

(High) Institutional
match  Little
need/pressure to
change/improve
governance

(High) Institutional
mismatch  Little
inbound influence on
governance, but
potentially positive
effects along FDI on
destination countries

(High) Institutional
mismatch  High
suspicion and pressure
to change

(High) Institutional
match  Little
need/pressure to
change/improve
governance

Meyer et al. supra note 41, at 340.
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For analytical convenience, a country can either be a (relatively)
strong governance regime or a (relatively) weak governance regime.
Admittedly, this dichotomous categorization may be oversimplified given
the complexity of assessing the quality of corporate governance
institutions. Several seminal attempts to compare corporate governance
across countries through quantitative indicators have been subject to
cautions and criticisms. 46 The quantitative governance indices present
limitations and inconsistencies among themselves. Nevertheless, their
results constantly show that most developed countries rank high on the
indices and most developing countries including China gravitate toward
the bottom. There should be little controversy if China is placed in the
weak governance category and developed countries such as Australia,
Canada, and the United States in the strong governance category.
When both the origin country and the destination country are of
the same type of governance regime (either strong or weak), it is labeled
as an institutional match. A high degree of institutional match indicates
there would be of little normative pressure on the investing SOE or the
investing state-owner to change its governance practices. In other words,
there would be only marginal inbound influence on the SOE governance
from such outward investment. The institutional match provides a
comfort zone for the SOE to continue its traditional practices even when
they operate across national boundaries. The upper left cell and the lower
right cell in Table 3 show the scenarios of institutional match. The upper
left cell shows a scenario in which an SOE from a strong corporate
governance regime invests in a parallel regime. An example is Statoil, a
Norwegian oil SOE, investing in Canada.47 The lower right cell shows a
46
The work that sparked using empirical methods in comparative corporate governance is
Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1113 (1998). Efforts on
ranking national corporate governance systems include: GMI, Country Rankings from
Governance Metrics International, http://www.gmiratings.com/BreakingNews.aspx;
WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2001-2014,
http://www.weforum.org/reports; Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, A Corporate
Governance Index: Convergence and Diversity of National Corporate Governance
Regulations
(CentER
Discussion
Paper
Series
No.
2010-17,
2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1557627. For critiques, see Ruth V.
Aguilera & Kurt A. Desender, Challenges in the Measuring of Comparative Corporate
Governance: A Review of the Main Indices, 8 RES. METHODOLOGY IN STRATEGY AND
MGMT. 289, 290 (2012) (arguing that there are challenges to compare corporate
governance effectiveness in different settings with a governance index); Sanjai Bhagat et
al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803,
1803 (2008) (arguing that “governance indices are highly imperfect instruments” for
various corporate issues); Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23
REV. FIN. STUD. 467, 467 (2010) (arguing that the corrected “antidirector rights index” fails
to support widely influential claims).
47
See
STATOIL,
STATOIL
IN
CANADA:
FACTS,
Statoil
(2014),
http://www.statoil.com/no/About/Worldwide/NorthAmerica/canada/OilSands/Downloads/s
tatoilincanada.pdf (introducing Statoil’s work in Canada).
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situation where an SOE from a weak governance regime invests in another
weaker regime, such as Sinopec, a Chinese SOE, investing in Nigeria.
To the contrary, when there is a high degree of institutional
mismatch between the origin country and the destination country,
institutional conformity would be a source of pressure to change
governance practices. But the direction of governance impact runs in
different ways, depending on where the stronger institutions are located.
The upper right cell in Table 3 illustrates a situation where a SOE from a
strong governance regime invests in a weaker regime. An example is
Norsk Hydro (controlled by the Norwegian government), which invests in
Mozambique.48 The governance impact tends to run in the direction from
the better regime to the weaker regime. The governance implication of
this type of investment has been well-examined in the FDI literature
concerning how FDI from advanced economies benefit (or harm) domestic
firms and institutional development of emerging markets.49
The lower left cell in Table 3 illustrates a scenario where an SOE
from a weak governance regime invests in a strong regime, such as
CNOOC investing in the United States. As shown in Section III, a
number of advanced economies including Australia, Canada and the
United States have enhanced review standards for foreign SOE
investments. Corporate governance is a main factor considered in these
review processes. Moreover, while the investment review systems are
based on statutes or regulations, the process is often politicized because
governments have considerable discretion in interpreting the meaning of
“national interests,” “net benefits,” and “national security.” As a result,
foreign SOEs may face not only legal and market pressure, but also
political pressure to change governance. This case of institutional
mismatch has the greatest potential of generating positive influence on the
investing SOE’s governance practices. This Article labels this scenario as
positive institutional mismatch, where there may be positive inward
influence derived from the outward investment.
The gist of Table 3 suggests that China’s SOEs are more likely to
adopt internationally-recognized corporate governance practices when
they invest in places of positive institutional mismatch and are much less
48

See Hydro Worldwide, NORSK HYDRO, fig.1, http://www.hydro.com/en/AboutHydro/Hydro-worldwide/ (illustrating the worldwide activities of Norsk Hydro and its
relative involvement in each country).
49
Brian J. Aitken & Ann E. Harrison, Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela. 89 AM. ECON. REV. 605, 605 (1999); Anh Dang,
How Foreign Direct Investment Promote Institutional Quality: Evidence from Vietnam, 41
J. COMP. ECON. 1054, 1054 (2013); Holger Gorg & David Greenaway, Much Ado about
Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment? 19 WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER 171, 171 (2004); Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, Does Foreign Direct
Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through
Backward Linkages, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 605, 605 (2004).
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likely to do so if they mainly invest in places of institutional match (i.e.
countries with similarly weak or even worse institutional conditions). It
raises an empirical question: in what types of foreign countries do Chinese
SOEs mainly invest? Do Chinese SOEs mainly invest in countries of
positive institutional mismatch, such as the United States? Extant
literature has focused on Chinese SOEs’ outward investment in Africa.
While the SOEs have contributed some significant economic development
to Africa, their governance, social, and environmental practices fail to
meet international standards by a wide margin. 50 If Africa or other
countries with weak corporate governance regimes are the main
investment destinations, it indicates that Chinese SOEs’ global expansion
would face little normative pressure to change their governance practices.
But governance reform potential is more likely to occur if they mainly
invest in advanced economies, especially those with regulatory processes
scrutinizing investments by foreign SOEs.
The macro-institutional distance between the origin country and
the destination country of investment provides a broad-brush baseline of
foreign SOEs’ governance change potential. But not all SOEs, even from
the same country, are the same. There are organizational-level variations
that may bring about different inbound influence from outward investment.
This Article considers two micro-organizational conditions, which are
commonly examined in international business literature: the firm’s entry
modes and types of investing entities.
Existing literature has shown how institutional distance between
the home country and the host country may influence a firm’s
internationalization strategies.51 A recent study shows that Chinese SOEs
50

See Namukale Chintu et al., Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in Africa: Myths and
Realities.
IVEY
BUS.
J.
(Mar./Apr.
2013),
http://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-in-africamyths-and-realities/ (stating that Chinese SOEs fall short of “good governance” standards
traditionally accepted in the international community, but these shortcomings are due to
China’s limited experience in internationalization); Patrick J. Kennan, Curse or Cure China, Africa, and the Effects of Unconditional Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 84, 88
(2009), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol27/iss1/4 (arguing that China’s
investments in Africa may have negative effects on local populations’ social welfare).
51
See, e.g., Lorraine Eden & Stewart R Miller, Distance Matters: Liability Of Foreignness,
Institutional Distance And Ownership Strategy, 16 ADVANCES IN INT’L MGMT. 187, 189
(2004) (suggesting that the key element of liability of foreignness is institutional distance
and examines the manner in which institutional distance affects the liability of
foreignness); Saul Estrin et al., The Impact of Institutional and Human Resource Distance
on International Entry Strategies, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 1171, 1171 (2009) (exploring the
role of institutional and human resource distances on foreign investment strategy); Dean
Xu & Oded Shenkar, Institutional Distance and The Multinational Enterprise, 27 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 608, 608 (2002) (analyzing the effect of institutional distance on the
normative, regulatory and cognitive dimensions on foreign market entry strategies); Delia
Ionascu et al., Institutional Distance and International Business Strategies in Emerging
Economies (William Davidson Institute, Working Paper No. 728), (2004) (arguing that the
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tend to choose joint ventures rather than acquisitions as the entry mode,
because acquiring an existing business increases the likelihood of facing
regulatory or political hurdles. 52 While the choice of entry modes is
affected by institutional distance between the home country and the host
country, once the choice has been made, the choice can subsequently
produce different levels of inbound influence derived from such outward
activity.
Common entry modes into foreign markets include two
categories: equity-based and non-equity based. Non-equity based entry
modes are exporting and licensing. Because non-equity based entry
modes have little exposure to the local corporate governance system of the
host country, it would induce only marginal inbound influence on the
foreign SOE’s governance. Equity-based entry modes can be divided into
two types by ownership: wholly-owned and partially-owned operations.
Wholly-owned operations are greenfield investments (i.e. setting up
wholly-owned subsidiaries or branches) and full acquisition of existing
local firms in the host country. Partially-owned operations refer to partial
acquisition of existing local firms or setting up joint ventures with local
firms in the host country. Among all these equity-based types, greenfield
investment is probably most integrated with the SOE’s headquarters and
least interacts with corporate governance of local firms in the host country.
Therefore, the inbound influence on the governance practices of the
investing SOE (parent company) in the home country can be limited.
Compared to greenfield investment, full acquisition will result in a higher
level of exposure to local corporate governance practices in the host
country.
Takeovers by foreign investors are often subject to regulatory
approval conditioned on some governance changes of the investing SOE.
Moreover, existing practices in the acquired company may continue and
thus potentially diffuse to the parent SOE in the home country. Partially
owned operations also possess great potential of inbound influence.
Partial acquisitions and joint ventures require SOEs to negotiate and
arrange governance structures with local shareholders. The ownership
interaction and integration create opportunities for foreign SOEs to learn
the operation of the corporate governance system in the host country.
Table 4 summarizes the types of entry modes and the levels of potential
inbound influence on corporate governance of SOEs in the home country.
Table 4: Entry Modes and Potential Inbound Influence on Corporate
Governance

“impact of distance varies with the different aspects of the concept of institutional
distance”).
52
Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, supra note 41 at 264.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

2015]
Entry Modes
Non-Equity Based
Exporting
Licensing
Equity-Based
Wholly-Owned
Operations
Green-Field
Investment
Full Acquisition
Partially-Owned
Operations
Partial Acquisition
Joint Ventures

CHINA'S NATIONAL CHAMPIONS

101

Potential Inbound Influence on Corporate
Governance
Low
Low

Low-Medium
Medium-High
Medium-High
Medium High

When deciding how to invest in a foreign country, firms need to
decide whether to invest directly itself or through subsidiaries. As
explained in Section II, a Chinese national champion is typically
organized as a vertically integrated corporate group with a holding
company controlling multiple layers of subsidiaries. If the holding
company itself engages in foreign investment, the holding company will
directly encounter normative pressure in the host country, which suggests
great potential for a change in governance within the holding company.
However, if foreign investment is mainly carried out through overseas
subsidiaries, the holding company may hide behind the layers of
ownership and avoid governance reform. This hierarchical ownership
structure creates degrees of distance between the holding company and its
overseas subsidiaries. On the one hand, the layered ownership may shield
overseas subsidiaries from the state-owner’s influence, which allows more
freedom for overseas subsidiaries to adopt local corporate governance
practices in the host country. On the other hand, the extended distance
may weaken the potential inbound influence on the holding company.
Therefore, it suggests a hypothesis that foreign investments made directly
by the holding company itself rather than through its subsidiaries are more
likely to elicit change in the holding company’s governance practices.
Finally, in addition to FDI, overseas listing is another important
strategy for Chinese SOEs to build international equity connections.
Some Chinese SOEs have listed shares in the world’s leading capital
markets including Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the
United Kingdom. The institutional relationship between China and the
major capital markets can be characterized as an institutional mismatch.
According to the bonding theory in corporate governance literature, firms
with a view to improve corporate governance, particularly those from
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emerging markets, may bond themselves to a better governance regime
through cross listing their shares. 53 By cross-listing in a stronger
institutional regime, such as the United States, Chinese SOEs must
comply with stricter standards and consequently have better governance.
A study shows that Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong have better
pay-performance sensitivity than the mainland firms without cross-listing
and the effect is greater for SOEs than private firms.54 Another study also
finds that Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore have better
corporate governance quality (measured by a combined index) than their
counterparts with only domestic listings.55 Scholars also find that China’s
overseas-listed SOEs have more professional boards of directors, greater
accounting conservatism, higher investment efficiency, and better stock
performance than their domestically listed counterparts. 56 Considering
that overseas listed firms are major members of China’s national
champions and their top management teams (including boards of
directors) often overlap with those of the holding companies, the overseaslisted subsidiaries may diffuse modern corporate governance practices,
such as the use of independent directors, back to their holding companies.
It suggests that the national champions that have an overseas listed
subsidiary are more likely to engage in corporate governance reform than
those without one.
Overall, the theoretical framework built with common ideas in
relevant international business literature assumes that Chinese SOEs are
responsive to market and other institutional pressures in host countries, but
the responsiveness is also affected by organizational factors, such as entry
modes and investment structure. 57 These theoretical predictions are
subject to empirical investigation.
V.
A.

Empirical Evidence

Data and Methodology

This Article empirically investigates whether internationalization
effectively drives the governance reform of China’s national champions,
the SOEs, under SASAC’s control. The period of investigation in this
53

John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1757 (2002).
54
Wei Chi & Haiyan Zhang, Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with CrossListing? Evidence from China, 21 CHINA ECON. REV. 150, 150 (2010).
55
Ling Mei Cong, Earnings Quality and Corporate Governance Bonding, 10 CORP.
OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 183, 183 (2013).
56
Mingyi Hung et al., Political Relations and Overseas Stock Exchange Listing: Evidence
from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises 2-4, (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/acy2/Staff/tjwong/HungWongZhangAug2008v8.pdf.
57
Meyer et al. supra note 41, at 1009-10.
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study is from 2003, the year of SASAC’s establishment, to 2013. As of
the end of 2013, there were 113 SOEs controlled by SASAC.58
Governance reform, as the dependent variable, will be measured
in two ways: whether the SOE has any outside directors on the board and
whether the SOE’s top management team includes any foreign-educated
executives. In the past decade, the most important governance reform of
these central SOEs has been the institutionalization of the board of
directors and independent directors.
In 2004, SASAC began to
experiment with the idea of establishing the board of directors in SOEs
under its supervision. According to SASAC’s initial design, the board of
directors generally should be comprised of no less than nine directors and
at least two should be outside directors; the percentage of outside directors
should gradually increase with improvement in the supply of outside
directors.59 As per SASAC’s most recent rules, the board size generally
should be between seven and thirteen directors, with a majority as outside
directors.60 Note that although most of the central SOEs did not have a
board of directors before SASAC’s policy, there were a number of
exceptions. For instance, China Chengtong Holdings Group Ltd, a
diversified industrial group, established the board of directors as early as
1992. These pre-SASAC boards were comprised of insiders only and
some had only chairman and vice-chairman without any other board
members. 61 Unlike the pre-SASAC board, the new board model that
SASAC promotes features outside directors.

58

At the beginning of SASAC’s establishment (2003), there were close to 200 SOEs under
SASAC’s control. SASAC has a goal to reduce the number of the SOEs down to 50-100,
mainly through the strategies of mergers and acquisitions among the enterprises. This
Article focuses on the reform pattern of the existing 113 SOEs. For the list of the central
SOEs, see Yangqi Minglu ( 央 企 名 录 ) [Name List of SOEs],
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86114/n86137/c1725422/content.html.
59
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Board of Directors in Wholly-State-Owned Companies] (promulgated by the State-Owned
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Mar. 20, 2009), art.22, CLI.4.118357(EN) (Lawinfochina).
61
Hongye Guo, Waibu Dongshi Dongshihui Shidian de Tupodian – Fang Zhongguo
Chengtong Jituan Dongshizhang Mazhengwu (外部董事董事会试点的突破点 – 访中国
诚通集团董事长马正武) [A Breakthrough of the Experiment of Boards with Outside
Directors – An Interview with the Chairman of China Chengtong Holdings Group:
Zhengwu
Ma],
DIRECTORS
&
BOARDS,
no.
1,
2009,
at
http://www.dongshihui.com.cn/Magazine/ArticleDetail/551.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/3

104

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

The adoption of outside directors creates the appearance that
China’s SOEs are converging with the international standard (or the
Anglo-Saxon model). While this governance change could be more in
form than substance, as the board of directors lacks the power to appoint
top managers and outside directors are often retired government officials
or former SOE executives, it may be an encouraging step forward to
substantive governance change. This Article uses the existence of outside
directors on the board to represent a type of governance change.62 The
data regarding whether and when the SOE has a board of directors and
outside directors were manually collected from the personnel
appointments announcements and enterprise reform releases posted on
SASAC’s website.
Corporate websites, annual reports, securities
prospectuses and news reports are also used as supplementary sources.
According to the data collected through this methodology, as of 2013,
forty-five of the 113 SOEs had at least one outside independent director
on the board.63
Whether the SOE has any foreign educated executive is the other
indicator of governance change. As the SOEs become multinational firms,
their management teams may include professionals with international
experience. My previous research shows that the SOE executive labor
market is overwhelmingly dominated by system-insiders and only a
marginal minority of the CEOs have any foreign education experience.64
Staffing with foreign-educated executives is a change of this governance
tradition. This Article collected data on educational backgrounds of the
CEOs and vice CEOs of the 113 SOEs as of 2013. Biographic
information was collected from corporate websites, annual reports and
prospectuses, government websites and documents, industrial association
websites, and news reports. There are 639 executives (113 CEOs and 526
vice CEOs). Of the 639 executives, fifty-six hold a foreign degree; and of
the 113 SOEs, thirty-six have at least one foreign-educated executive.
Internationalization, as the independent variable, will be focused
on international equity linkages. As illustrated in Section IV, equity
connections have greater potential to trigger governance change,
compared to non-equity connections, such as exporting. International
equity connections may be constructed in many forms and will be tested in
the following ways. First, international equity connections can be made
62
If the SOE has at least an independent director, it is coded as 1; if not, it is coded as 0. It
would be ideal to use the number of independent directors as a dependent variable.
However, in many cases, the exact number of independent directors cannot be confirmed.
63
Note that there are cases where the board of directors was announced to be established
but the positions of outside directors were not filled or could not be confirmed through
publically available data. Such cases were not included in the study. This typically
happened for firms that announced the intention to establish a board in 2012 or 2013.
64
Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive
Career Approach, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 743, 770 (2013).
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through cross-border joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions. Data on
cross-border joint ventures as well as mergers and acquisitions were
manually collected from the SDC Platinum Database. The transactions
include deals by the parent company and its subsidiaries in the period of
2003-2011. An SOE’s degree of internationalization is operationalized as
the number of deals accumulated from 2003 to year t-1.65 Year t is the
data year for the dependent variable. Correlation coefficients will be
computed to examine the relationship between the accumulated number of
deals (at year t-1) and the dependent variables (at year t).
Second, the central SOEs’ overseas greenfield establishments are
another type of equity connections that expose the SOEs to foreign
institutional pressure. Data on the number of the central SOEs’ overseas
subsidiaries were collected from the Directory of Overseas Investment
Institutions, a database maintained by the Ministry of Commerce of China.
The database contains the new establishments of overseas investment
entities subject to the Ministry of Commerce’s approval.66 While not all
establishments of overseas operations are subject to regulatory approval,
the data can serve as an estimate of the number of overseas greenfield
subsidiaries.67 The database covers the central SOEs’ investments as early
as 1983, but most of the investment occurred after 2000, the year in which
the “going global” policy was formally introduced. According to the
database, as of 2012, the central SOEs established 1,680 overseas
operations. The degree of internationalization is measured as the
accumulated number of overseas subsidiaries toward year t-1. Correlation
coefficients will show the relationship between the accumulated number
of subsidiaries (at year t-1) and the dependent variables (at year t).
Third, overseas listing is another way to build international equity
connections. Simple linear regression will be used to examine the

65
Ideally, it would also include the volume of the transactions. Unfortunately, the SDC
Platinum Database does not provide the dollar amount of many of the transactions.
66
The database is accessible at Jingwai Touzi Qiye (Jigou) Minglu (境外投资企业（机构）

名 录 ) [Name List of Overseas Investment Companies (Agencies)],
http://wszw.hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/fecp/fem/corp/fem_cert_stat_view_list.jsp.
67
Guowuyuan Guanyu Touzi Tizhi Gaige de Jueding (国务院关于投资体制改革的决定)
[Decision of the State Council on Reforming the Investment System], Guo Fa [2004]
No.20, (promulgated by the State Council, July 16, 2004, effective July 16, 2004), LEXIS
China Online, htttp://www.lexiscn.com (stating the State Council’s Decision declares that
all of the central SOEs’ overseas investments should be subject to approval or notice,
depending on the size of the investment); Jingwai Touzi Guanli Banfa (境外投资管理办
法) [Measures on the Administration of Overseas Investment] Order of the Ministry of
Commerce [2009] No. 5, (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 16, 2009,
effective May 1, 2009), LEXIS China Online, htttp://www.lexiscn.com (providing the
latest conditions under which the investment would be subject to approval by Ministry of
Commerce).
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relationship between the time of overseas listing and the time of
introducing independent directors.
Finally, this Article will use logistic regressions to examine the
relationship between internationalization and governance attributes.68 The
dependent variables will be whether there was any outside director on the
board and whether there was any foreign-educated top manager in 2013.
The independent variables will be various internationalization indicators,
including the accumulated number of acquisitions toward 2011, the
accumulated number of joint ventures toward 2011, the accumulated
number of overseas subsidiaries as of 2012, and whether the group has an
overseas-listed firm.69 The control variables will include: logged revenues
(2010) to control for firm size, ROA (2010) for efficiency,70 and whether
the SOE has vice-ministerial rank.71 Groups that hold a higher status in
the government system (i.e., vice-ministerial rank) would be more
impervious to international pressure, as they are closer to the inner circle
of China’s domestic political power.
B.
Results
Table 5 shows the number of the central SOEs’ overseas
acquisitions, joint ventures, and subsidiary establishments by country in
the period of 2003-2011. Hong Kong has been an important place for the
central SOEs’ activity in overseas acquisitions, joint ventures, and
subsidiaries. However, Chinese SOEs’ investments in Hong Kong very
often are simply “round-tripping” – where Chinese firms take money
offshore, dress up in financial secrecy, then return back home to enjoy the
tax benefits available only to foreigners.72 Moreover, the SOEs often use

68

Logistic regression is used to model dichotomous outcome variables. The dependent
variables (whether the SOE has at least one independent director and whether the
management team includes any foreign educated executive) have binary outcomes (i.e., yes
or no).
69
The data years vary because the data collection process for the variables started and
ended at different times. The time difference would not significantly change the outcomes
as the numbers of deals do not change significantly from year to year. As to the variable of
whether the group has an overseas listed firm, it is coded 1 if the SOE has an overseas
listed firm; 0 if without an overseas listed subsidiary.
70
The 113 central SOEs are not publicly traded companies and therefore do not have an
obligation to publish their financial performance or other information. SASAC
occasionally disclosed some of these SOEs’ individual financial data. The latest release
was the 2010 data.
71
Of the 113 central SOEs, fifty-three hold vice-ministerial ranks in the government
administration system. The top managers of these vice-ministerial level SOEs are directly
appointed by the Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party.
72
Randall Morck et al., Perspectives on China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 39 J.
INT’L BUS. STUD. 337, 340 (2008); Dylan Sutherland & John Anderson, The Pitfalls of
Using Foreign Direct Investment Data to Measure Chinese Multinational Enterprise
Activity, 221 CHINA Q. 21, 24-25 (Mar. 2015); Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s
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Hong Kong incorporated companies to engage in investment in other
countries, which makes Hong Kong more a portal than a destination of the
SOEs’ foreign investment.73 Excluding Hong Kong, the top countries of
the central SOEs’ acquisition activities are Australia, Canada, the United
States, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. These countries (except
Singapore) are liberal markets as per the varieties-of-capitalism
literature,74 politically mature democracies, and within the common law
family. In other words, the central SOEs’ acquisition activities take place
significantly in countries whose institutional environments are very
dissimilar from China, which features state ownership, authoritarian
government, and the civil law system (considered a “bad” corporate law
regime as per the “law and finance” literature).75 Australia, Canada, and
the United States are also the countries that have regulations specifically
addressing concerns about investment by foreign SOEs. This high degree
of institutional mismatch suggests Chinese SOEs could face great
normative pressure on their governance structure when entering these
markets.
Table 5: Overseas Investment Deals of China’s National Champions, 200376
2011
Location of Acquisitons
Number of Acquisition Deals
(%)

Location of Joint Ventures
Number of JV Deals (%)

Hong Kong
198 (35.5%)
Australia
76 (13.6%)
Canada
47 (8.4%)
United States
27 (4.8%)
Singapore
20 (3.6%)
Brazil
18 (3.2%)
United Kingdom

Australia
26 (12.3%)
Hong Kong
21 (10.0%)
United States
21 (10.0%)
Canada
11 (5.2%)
Russia
11 (5.2%)
Saudi Arabia
8 (3.8%)
Taiwan

Location of Subsidariy
Establishements
Number of Subsidairy
Establishments (%)
Hong Kong
360 (15.5%)
United States
91 (3.6%)
United Arab Emirates
64 (2.8%)
Australia
62 (2.7%)
Singapore
55 (2.4%)
British Virgin Island
54 (2.3%)
Saudi Arabia

Round-Tripping FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications (Latin Am./Caribbean and Asia/Pac.
Econ. and Bus. Ass’n, Working Paper No. 24, 2004).
73
Morck et al., supra note 72, at 339-340.
74
Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, V ARIETIES of CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 19 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds.,
2001).
75
Rafael La Porta et al., supra note 46, at 1113 (arguing that the common law system is
better able to protect investors than the civil law system).
76
Raw data on acquisitions and joint ventures are manually collected from the SDC
Platinum M&A database; raw data on subsidiary establishments are manually collected
from Directory of Overseas Investment Institutions published by Ministry of Commerce of
China.
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16 (2.9%)
Nigeria
8 (1.4%)
Kazakhstan
8 (1.4%)
Chile
8 (1.4%)
Indonesia
8 (1.4%)
Others
124 (1.4%)
Total
558 (100%)

7 (3.3%)
Indonesia
6 (2.8%)
Japan
5 (2.4%)
India
5 (2.4%)
South Korea
5 (2.4%)
Others
85 (40.3%)
Total
211(100%)

48 (2.1%)
Russia
45 (1.9%)
Germany
39 (1.7%)
Indonesia
39 (1.7%)
Zambia
38 (1.6%)
Others
1,431 (61.5%)
Total
2,326 (100%)

Chinese Aquisitor (by type)

Chinese JV Partner (by
type)
Parent Company
77 (34.5%)
Subsidiary
134 (63.5%)
Total
211 (100%)

Investing Entity

Parent Company
90 (16.1%)
Subsidiary
468 (83.9%)
Total
558(100%)
Ownership Stake After
Acquisition
<50 percent
77 (13.8%)
>=50 percent
190 (34.1%)
Unknown
291 (52.2%)
Total
558 (100%)

Equity Stake in JV

Average Stake
68.9% (N=267)

Average Stake
48.9% (N=129)

Parent Company
192 (8.3%)
Subsidiary
2,134 (91.7%)
Total
2,326 (100%)

<50 percent
36 (17.1%)
>=50 percent
93 (44.1%)
Unknown
82 (38.9%)
Total
211(100%)

Table 5 also shows that, excluding missing data, a majority of the
deals are acquisitions of absolute controlling stakes. The average
acquisition of a controlling stake was 68.9%. The popularity in acquiring
controlling ownership suggests Chinese SOEs may be more interested in
being an active controller than a passive observer in corporate
management. Their control interest is often suspected especially when
there is a great degree of institutional mismatch between China and the
investment destinations.
Table 5 further shows that 83.9% of the acquisitions are done
through the downstream subsidiaries rather than the parent companies in
the corporate groups (i.e. the holding companies directly under SASAC’s
control). As discussed in Section IV, the subsidiaries are embedded in the
business group network controlled by the holding company and ultimately
by the party-state. This ownership structure can effectively shield the
holding company and the party-state from disclosing their governance
practices and even hide actual practices behind subsidiaries. In such cases,
the holding companies are not directly exposed to foreign normative
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pressure; therefore, governance influence, if at all, tends to be limited to
the subsidiaries.
In addition to direct acquisitions, joint ventures are another type of
international equity connections. Australia, the United States, and Canada
again have the highest concentration of the foreign joint venture deals.
About 35% of the joint ventures are established through the parent
companies, much higher than acquisition deals, where there are only about
16% via the parent companies. Because joint ventures are usually not
subject to foreign investment regulatory reviews in the host country,
parent companies themselves, even without using subsidiaries as a shield,
can still maintain obscurity about their governance practices to
foreigners.77
Table 5 also shows the geographic distribution of subsidiary
establishments. Hong Kong again tops the list, as it has been used as a
main portal to foreign investment. Unlike mergers and joint ventures,
subsidiary establishments are not obviously concentrated in a few
advanced economies, but, rather, are widely dispered in a large number of
countries. No single country (except Hong Kong) exerts any significant
influence. Diverse investment locations may dilute institutional pressure
from any particular country. Moreover, most (91.7%) of them are
established through subsidiaries rather than parent companies, which
distance the parent SOEs from foreign institutional pressure.
Table 6 further shows the correlation between various
internationalization indicators and whether the central SOE has any
outside director on its board. The degree of internationalization, whether
measured as the number of overseas acquisitions, the number of overseas
joint ventures, or the number of overseas subsidiary establishments, has a
very weak or virtually zero correlation with the existence of an outside
director on the board. Investments directly made by the parent companies
themselves do not present any better chance of adopting an outside
director. Furthermore, investments in Australia, Canada, and the United
States also do not provide a meaningful positive correlation. In contrast,
the high degree of institutional mismatch theoretically may generate
regulatory
or
normative
pressure
to
change
governance.
Internationalization is also virtually irrelevant to whether the SOE has any
foreign-educated executives, as shown in Table 7.

77
As shown in Table 2, all the foreign investment regulations only regulate acquisition of
an existing business rather than creation of a business entity such as a joint venture.
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Table 6: Point-Biserial Coefficients between Internationalization and Outside
Directors
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

All Deals

.008

-.027

-.049

-.067

-.111

-.120

-.141

-.006

Deals by Parent Company

-.045

-.091

-.074

-.084

-.132

-.126

-.169

.046

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

.123

-.031

-.024

-.045

-.084

-.093

-.119

.009

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

.110

-.003

-.028

-.057

-.106

-.116

-.125

-.021

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded) by Parent
Company

-.037

-.085

-.032

-.010

-.101

-.109

-.172

.073

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included) by Parent
Company

-.038

-.085

-.032

-.019

-.109

-.119

-.182

.086

Deals in Australia, Canada,
USA by Parent Company

-.023

-.067

-.079

-.086

-.128

-.123

-.173

.027

All Deals

.082

-.039

-.024

-.037

-.043

-.086

-.099

.051

Deals by Parent Company

.103

-.032

-.004

-.019

-.026

-.072

-.071

.052

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

-.065

-.023

-.052

-.058

-.024

-.080

-.041

.111

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

-.062

-.050

-.061

-.074

-.064

-.113

-.082

.046

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded) by Parent
Company

-.022

-.053

-.058

-.001

.020

-.065

.059

.126

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included) by Parent
Company

-.022

-.065

-.069

-.014

.006

-.074

.048

.103

Deals in Australia, Canada,
USA by Parent Company

---a

-.040

-.041

056

.038

-.046

-.057

-.044

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

All Establishments

-.052

.015

.146

.013

.006

-.018

-.032

.008

Establishments by Parent
Company

-.052

.058

.131

.121

.054

.121

.162

.168

Correlations between
Number of Acquisitions
and Existence of Outside
Directors

Correlations between
Number of Joint Ventures
and Existence of Outside
Directors

Correlations between
Number of Overseas
Subsidiaries and Existence
of Outside Directors

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

2015]

CHINA'S NATIONAL CHAMPIONS

111

Establishments in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

-.067

.051

.084

.041

.049

.031

.058

.120

Establishments in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

-.047

.101

.136

.105

.077

.046

.052

.165

Establishments in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded) by Parent
Company

-.046

.063

.037

.026

-.018

-.039

.047

.107

Establishments in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included) by Parent
Company

-.049

.056

.029

.014

-.038

-.032

.066

.161

Establishments in Australia,
Canada, USA by Parent
Companies

-.037

.022

.004

-.014

-.067

-.075

.107

.097

Ｎ

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

Deals are accumulated to the prior year. For example, in 2005, the correlation is between
the number of deals accumulated toward 2004 (t-1) and whether the firm had an outside
director in 2005 (t). Advanced economies include countries according to IMF Advanced
Economies List (World Economic Outlook, October 2012, p. 180).
Point-biserial correlation is a measure of the strength of a relationship between one
continuous variable and one dichotomous variable. The correlation coefficient is between 1
(perfect positive correlation) and -1 (perfect negative correlation). When the correlation
coefficient is close to zero, it means virtually no correlation. It is generally considered a
weak positive correlation if the coefficient is between 0.1 and 0.3; a weak negative
correlation if between -0.1 and -0.3.
a
All the observations have zero deals; therefore, no value can be provided.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/3

112

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

Table 7: Correlation between Internationalization and Foreign-Educated Top
Managers
Existence of
Foreign-Educated
Executives (2013)
(1)

Number of ForeignEducated Executives
(2013)
(2)

All Deals

.089

.139

Deals by Parent Companies

.145

.107

Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

.071

.060

Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

.098

.157

Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies
(Hong Kong Excluded)

.194

.157

Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies
(Hong Kong Included)

.205

.166

Deals by Parent Company in Australia, Canada,
USA

.148

.149

All Deals

.156

.173

Deals by Parent Companies

.191

.148

Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

.093

.214

Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

.109

.240

Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies
(Hong Kong Excluded)

.194

.157

Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies
(Hong Kong Included)

.161

.193

Deals by Parent Companies in Australia, Canada,
USA

.071

.030

All Establishments

.039

-.028

Establishments by Parent Companies

.133

.185

Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong
Kong Excluded)

.009

-.025

Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong
Kong Included)

.013

.004

Establishments by Parent Company in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong Excluded)

.063

.162

Establishments by Parent Company in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong Included)

.093

.182

Establishments by Parent Companies in Australia,
Canada, USA

-.037

.042

Accumulated Number of Acquisitions (2011)

Accumulated Number of Joint Ventures (2011)

Accumulated Number of Subsidiary
Establishment (2012)
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113
113
Ｎ
Column 1 reports point-biserial correlation coefficients that measure the relationship between a
dichotomous variable and a quantitative variable. Column 2 reports Pearson correlation coefficients
that measure the relationship between two quantitative variables. The correlation coefficients are
always between 1 (perfect positive correlation) and -1 (perfect negative correlation). When the
correlation coefficient is close to zero, it means virtually no correlation. It is generally considered a
weak positive correlation if the coefficient is between 0.1 and 0.3; a weak negative correlation if
between
-0.1
and
-0.
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Figure 1 shows a simple linear regression on the time of an SOE’s
overseas IPO (initial public offering) and the time of its establishment of
outsider directors. 78 It shows that earlier overseas listing is associated
with later, rather than earlier, adoption of outsider directors. In theory, a
parent SOE that is exposed to international corporate governance through
its overseas-listed subsidiary should adopt outsider directors earlier than a
parent SOE who has not been exposed as long to international corporate
governance. However, the findings here cast doubt over the idea that
international influence is a main driver of the central SOEs’ governance
reform.
Figure 1: Relationship between Time of Overseas Listing and Time of
Institutionalizing Independent Directors
2014
2012
Time of
Institutionali2010
zing
Independent2008
Directors
(Year) 2006
2004
1990

y = -0.16x + 2,330.73
R² = 0.14

1995

2000
2005
2010
Time of Overseas Listing (Year)

2015

Table 8 shows logistic regressions on internationalization
indicators and governance attributes. Models 1-8 show the relationship
between internationalization and existence of any outside directors on the
board. Note that in Models 2, 4, 6, and 7, all of the odds ratios for
international indicators are close to one, suggesting virtually no effect of
internationalization on the existence of outsider directors. The odds ratios
for the number of acquisitions (.760, Model 3) and the number of joint
ventures (.367, Model 5) made by parent companies in
Australia/Canada/USA are less than one. It means that parent SOEs that
have more acquisitions and joint ventures in countries with high
institutional mismatch are less likely to have outsider directors on the
board. This finding is contrary to the theoretical prediction. Having an
overseas listing subsidiary increases the odds of having an outside director
on the board in the parent SOE, but the effect is small (1.841, Model 8).
Models 9-16 show the relationship between internationalization
and existence of any foreign educated executives. Note that the odds
78
Some Chinese national champions have multiple overseas listed subsidiaries. Figure 1
uses the time of the earliest overseas IPO in the corporate group.
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ratios of the number of overseas acquisitions (.998, Model 10), joint
ventures (1.063, Model 12), and overseas subsidiary establishments (.998,
Model 14) are close to one, indicating virtually no relationship between
these internationalization indicators and existence of any foreign educated
executives in the parent SOE. Both the number of acquisitions (1.391,
Model 11) and the number of joint ventures (1.332, Model 13) made by
parent companies in Australia, Canada, and the U.S. have positive effects
on the existence of foreign educated managers, but the effects are small.
Moreover, having an overseas-listed subsidiary significantly reduces the
odds of having a foreign-educated executive in the parent SOE by 73.9%
(=1-0.261). The result is contrary to the expectation that overseas listing
would indirectly expose the parent SOE to international corporate
governance and thus increase the chances of including a foreign-educated
professional in the top management team.
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For control variables, SOEs with larger revenues are more likely
to adopt outside directors but generally less likely to have foreigneducated executives. More profitable firms (measured by ROA) are more
likely to have outside directors and foreign-educated top managers. The
vice-ministerial SOEs in the government system are less likely to have
outsider directors on the board but more likely to have foreign educated
executives.
VI.

Implications

A. The Convergence-Persistence Debate
A major debate in comparative corporate governance scholarship
since the turn of the century has been focused on the future of national
corporate governance systems in the era of globalization—will systems
converge on a universal model (especially the Anglo-Saxon model) or will
they continue to retain their national characteristics?
The debate has reached a theoretical impasse between marketimperative theories predicting global embracement of shareholder primacy
and path-dependence theories predicting persistence of national
institutions that protect domestic vested interest. 79 China, despite its
enormous economy, is glaringly absent in the debate, particularly in the
works that set the fundamental framework of analysis. The persuasive
power of these competing theories would be limited without China.
According to the convergence school, capital market integration
through cross-border mergers and acquisitions as well as overseas listing
is a strong driver of governance convergence.80 International mergers and
acquisitions connect firms of different governance systems and often
require changes in the governance structure of acquiring or acquired firms,
or both. Overseas listing connects the listing firm to foreign investors and
requires the firm to adopt governance rules set by the foreign stock
exchange and relevant regulators, making the governance structure of the
listing firm converge on the model of the listing jurisdiction.81 Unlike the
convergence school, the persistence theories suggest limited convergence
for SOEs embedded in China’s idiosyncratic state capitalism.
Recent SOE reforms in China, such as launching the board of
directors and institutionalizing independent directors, indicate at least

79

For the major pieces in the debate, see generally CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6-14 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark. J. Roe eds., 2004) (discussing
forces inducing convergence and forces inducing persistence in corporate governance
systems).
80
Toru Yoshikawa & Abdul A. Rasheed, Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical
Review and Future Directions, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 388, 390 (2009).
81
Coffee, supra note 53, at 1799-1800.
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some “formal convergence” 82 or “de jure convergence” 83 toward the
Anglo-Saxon model. Ostensibly, the adoption of Anglo-Saxon practices
appears to be encouraging evidence to convergence theories. However,
preliminary empirical findings in this Article raise questions about
whether internationalization is an apt explanation for Chinese SOEs’
governance change, particularly for those deeply embedded in the political
and economic network controlled by the state owner. Why do Chinese
national champions’ international investment activities have little bearing
on their governance reform pace? If it is not internationalization, what is
the main driving force for their governance reform? This Article offers
some possible explanations for the weak relationship between
international equity connections and the central SOEs’ governance change.
First, the idea that international equity connections either through
FDI or overseas listing can push for governance change of the parent
SOEs assumes that there is some diffusion of governance practices
flowing from the host country back to the headquarters in the home
country. However, the diffusion influence may be diluted through layers
of ownership that shield the parent SOE from international pressure to
reform. As shown previously in Table 5, a majority of the investment
deals are done through subsidiaries rather than the holding companies
themselves. Available information suggests there is often limited
communication between the overseas subsidiaries and their parent
companies headquartered in Beijing. 84 This investment structure and
limited communication may weaken the potential governance influence.
Moreover, while the top investment destinations are advanced economies
with regulatory processes scrutinizing investments by foreign SOEs, they
only account for a minority of the transactions. As of the 558 acquisitions,
82

Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L., 329, 332 (Spring 2001).
83
See Tarun Khanna et al., Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance: A
Cross-Country Analysis, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 69, 71 (2006) (defining de jure
convergence as the adoption of similar corporate governance laws across countries and de
facto convergence as similarities in actual practices); id. at 76-81 (finding empirically
strong evidence of de jure convergence, though not on the U.S. style, and no evidence of
de facto convergence).
84
Interview with a manager of central SOE’s listed subsidiary who managed legal issues of
the company’s overseas acquisitions (May 21, 2011); interview with an executive of
central SOE’s overseas subsidiary in North America (Dec. 10, 2013). News reports also
often report that the parent SOEs have little tracking ability over their overseas subsidiaries’
activities. See, e.g., Bingning Wang, Zhongshiyou Fanfu Yanshen Zhi Haiwai Yewu
Lvgongxun Jieguan Zhuoshou Chongzheng (中石油反腐延伸至海外业务 吕功训接管着
手重整) [CNPC Anti-Corruption Extends to Overseas Business, Gongxun Lv Takes on the
Task to Reform], CHINA TIMES, May 24, 2014; Bang An, Yangqi Haiwai Zichan Jianguan
Queshi Youxiao Zhidu ( 央 企 海 外 资 产 监 管 缺 失 有 效 制 度 ) [The Lack of Effective
Supervision over Central SOEs’ Overseas Assets], CAIJING (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://comments.caijing.com.cn/20150320/3844611.shtml
(stating
the
lack
of
communication between the foreign subsidiaries and the parent company).
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only 150 of the deals are invested in Australia, Canada and United States;
and of the 150, only twenty-six are by holding companies themselves. As
a result, China’s national champions may have insufficient direct exposure
to environments of high institutional mismatch.
Second, it entails an inquiry into Chinese SOEs’ globalization
motivation. The Chinese government formally ushered in the “going
global” policy in 2000. According to the official statements, the “going
global” policy is aimed at participating in international technology
cooperation and competition, take full advantages of international and
domestic markets, encourage external processing trade, resources
exploration as well as international construction contracting and develop a
collection of multinational companies and well-known brands. 85
Corporate governance improvement seems not a primary consideration
from Chinese policymakers’ perspective.
Consistent with the
government’s policy, existing empirical studies focus on non-corporate
governance factors and confirm that market size expansion and natural
resources acquisitions are important motives for Chinese SOEs’ outward
direct investments.86
Also, individual firms may not be motivated to improve corporate
governance through FDI. As we have seen, Hong Kong accounts for a
large portion of the foreign investment deals. It is believed that most of
Hong Kong transactions are through shell companies for “round-tripping”
rather than real investments.87 Therefore, this form of foreign investment
does not really expose the investing SOEs to any institutional pressure in
the host country, let alone generating any positive flow-back effect to their
headquarters. As the Chinese government recently has completely phased
out all preferential treatments for foreign enterprises,88 it is to be observed
85

Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Dishige Wunian Jihua Gangyao (国民经济和社会发
展第十个五年计划纲要) [Guidelines on National Economic and Social Development of
the 10th Five Year Plan] (promulgated by the 4th Meeting of the National Congress, Mar.
15, 2001), http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm.
86
See Peter J. Buckley et al., The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct
Investment, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 499, 499 (2007) (arguing that natural resource seeking
is one of the main reasons for China’s FDI); Luke Hurst, Comparative Analysis of the
Determinants of China's State-Owned Outward Direct Investment in OECD and NonOECD Countries, 19 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 74, 74 (2011) (arguing that market size
expansion and natural resources are reasons for China’s outward direct investment); Ivar
Kolstad & Arne Wiig, What Determines Chinese Outward FDI?, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 26, 26
(2012) (arguing that China’s outward FDI focuses on large markets with abundant natural
resources).
87
Xiao, supra note 72.
88
In the past, China gave a variety of favorable treatments for foreign investors, but this
preference policy began to change in 2006. In 2007, China enhanced its supervision over
foreign investments involving national security sectors. In 2008, the unified Corporate
Income Tax Act, which treats domestic and foreign corporations alike. As of Dec. 1, 2010,
China terminated the last two tax preferences (urban maintenance and construction tax and
education surcharge) for foreign investors.
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how this policy change will reshape the SOEs’ foreign investment
motivation and destination choices.
While Chinese policymakers might not intend governance
improvement through international trade or outward direct investment,
they indeed took overseas listing as an important internationalization
strategy to improve SOE governance. 89 Scholars have shown that
overseas listed SOEs have lower earnings management, more professional
directors on the board, higher investment efficiency and greater firm
valuation than their domestically listed counterparts. 90 However,
preliminary empirical evidence in this Article indicates that the positive
effects are limited to the listed subsidiaries and not effectively reflected in
their parent companies. The lack of positive diffusion to the parent
companies may be related to the typical way of how Chinese SOEs crafted
their overseas listings. The conventional strategy has been to carve out the
crown jewel assets of the group and bundle them into the listed firm while
leaving bad assets and other problems in the unlisted part of the corporate
group, usually the holding company. 91 This assets segregation strategy
may practically concentrate complex corporate problems in the holding
company and thus make the governance reform of the holding company
more challenging and insensitive to international influence.
Finally, the behavior of China’s SOEs is determined not only by
market forces but probably more by the government’s decisions. It is
often the Chinese government rather than the market that selects which
firms to engage in reform. The Chinese government determined which
firms could list shares publicly and abroad.92 SASAC selected in batches
which SOEs were eligible to experiment with the board of directors,
independent directors and other reform measures.93 SASAC together with
the Party’s Organization Department consider factors (e.g. political loyalty)

89

Niuyue Shangshi Yangqi Yida 68 Jia, Jixu Guli Yangqi Haiwai Shangshi (纽约上市央
企 已达 68 家 ，继 续鼓励 央企 海外 上市 ) [Already 68 NYSE Listed Central SOEs,
Continue Encouraging More], SECURITIES DAILY, Aug. 24, 2008 (reporting then-SASAC
chairman’s statements in a press conference regarding the purposes of overseas listing).
90
See Mingyi Hung et al., supra note 56, at 22-26 (showing that overseas listed SOEs tend
have lower profitability and more professional boards than the domestically listed SOEs). .
91
CARL WALTER & FRASER HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: INSIDE CHINA’S STOCK MARKETS
99 (2003).
92
The initial public offering (IPO) system in China is approval-based system. But the
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission is considering a registration-based system in
replace of the approval-based system.
93
For instance, in 2004, seven SOEs were selected in the first batch to institute a board of
directors; afterwards, many SOEs in several batches were included to participate in the
reform. A recent example is in July 2014, SASAC selected six SOEs to experiment with
“four major reforms” (i.e. creation of a state-owned assets operation company,
implementation of mixed ownership, marketization of the top management team, and
establishment of anti-corruption inspection committees).
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other than market demand when appointing top managers.94 While there
is no direct evidence showing how Chinese policymakers prioritize SOEs
on the reform agenda, it seems that the degree of internationalization is an
unimportant factor in determining who gets reformed first. The reform
pace is more determined by complex domestic forces than by international
market or regulatory pressure.
Over the past decade, China’s national champions have made
some headway toward international standard practices (such as adopting
the board of directors and independent directors), but their reform pace
appears largely unrelated to their activity in international investment or
exposure to global capital markets. Their (at least) formal governance
change lends some support to convergence, but the impetus for change
seems to have little to do with their degree of integration with
international markets. Neither the convergence nor persistence side alone
offers a full explanation.
B. China’s SOE Reform Forward
With the political transition in 2012, China’s SOEs have entered a
new round of reform. The reform agenda appears ambitious and
comprehensive, ranging from ownership to various corporate governance
issues. Among other changes, “going global” remains a key strategic
policy for corporate growth. 95 The recently unveiled “Silk Road
Economic Belt” policy, which seeks to establish new trade and transport
links between China, Central Asia, and Europe, involves a tremendous
amount of overseas infrastructure investment typically undertaken by the
SOEs under SASAC.96 Thus, the Chinese national champions are likely to
continue their important roles in China’s global expansion.
Chinese SOEs often perceive foreign investment reviews in host
countries as unfriendly or discriminative.97 This perception partly induces
Chinese SOEs to use subsidiaries to engage in their overseas expansion in
94

See Lin, supra note 64 at 789-791 (noting that an investigation of Chinese SOE
executive backgrounds show that factors such as political loyalty play a role in determining
SOE leadership).
95
Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Di Shier Ge Wunian Guihua Gangyao (国民经济和社
会 发 展 第 十 二 个 五 年 规 划 纲 要 ) [Guidelines on National Economic and Social
Development of the 12th Five-Year Plan] pt. 52 (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://ghs.ndrc.gov.cn/ghwb/gjwngh/201109/P020110919590835399263.pdf.
96
See Dingding Chen, China's 'Marshall Plan' Is Much More, DIPLOMAT, Nov. 10, 2014
(explaining the meaning behind China’s “one belt, one road” plan); Jeremy Page, China
Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2014 (explaining China’s
plan on “Silk Road Economic Belt”).
97
See, e.g., Chester Dawson and Elena Cherney, China Diplomat Assails Canada’s
Restrictions on Foreign State Enterprises, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-oil-patch-diplomat-assails-canadas-investmentrestrictions-on-foreign-state-owned-enterprises-1412948502 (discussing China’s top
diplomat’s criticism towards Chinese SOEs’ being unfairly treated in Canada).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/3

122

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

order to avoid opposition in the host country.98 But the use of subsidiaries,
sometimes chains of subsidiaries, may exacerbate the agency problem in
SOEs. Globalizing SOEs have a “triple” agency problem. 99 The first
agency relationship exists in which the citizens of the country as nominal
shareholders (principals) task politicians (agents) to monitor the SOE’s
behavior and performance. Politicians may use SOEs to serve their own
interests rather than pursing the objectives mandated by the citizens. But
citizens have limited control over politicians, especially in a political
regime where democratic elections are prohibited. The second agency
relationship exists where politicians delegate managers to manage the
SOE. The managers may have objectives diverging from the objectives of
citizens and politicians. If the SOE is globalized through subsidiaries, a
third agency relationship exists between the headquarters and the
subsidiaries.
Overseas subsidiaries may escape their principals’
monitoring; as the Chinese proverb says “Heaven is high and the emperor
is far away.” It has been reported that SASAC and the parent SOEs
headquartered in Beijing have little tracking over foreign subsidiaries’
activities and there is ample room for overseas managers to engage in
corruption. 100 It is hard to expect that the “going out” policy would
generate any positive flow-back effects to the parent SOEs if they have
little knowledge about what is going on in their subsidiaries.
In very recent years, SASAC has introduced many regulations in
an attempt to intensify monitoring over SOE overseas subsidiaries.101 In
98

To be sure, besides political concerns, there are some economic reasons such as tax
benefits to invest through subsidiaries.
99
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et al., Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational
Companies, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 919, 931 (2014).
100
See, e.g., Bingning Wang supra note 83; Meiti Cheng Yangqi Haiwai Yewu Cun Fubai,
Guoyou Zichan Liushi Hen Pubian (媒体称央企海外业务存腐败 国有资产流失很普遍)
[Media Reports Corruption in Central SOEs’ Overseas Business, Squandering StateOwned
Assets
is
Common],
PEOPLE
DAILY,
May
26,
2014,
http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0526/c1002-25066234.html (discussing the corruption
in China’s overseas business which has caused squandering of state-owned assets).
101
In response to an outbreak of SOE overseas investment scandals, SASAC promulgated
Provisional Measures on Supervising Central Enterprises’ Overseas Assets (2011) and
Provisional Measures Managing Central Enterprises’ Overseas Property Rights (2011) and
Provisional Measures Managing Central Enterprises’ Overseas Investment (2012). As of
2011, 27.3% of the about 2000 overseas subsidiaries of the central SOEs were running at a
loss and 72.7% were making profits or breaking even, according to the Department Head
(Mr. Ziming Shi) of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of
Commerce Press Conference. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s
Republic of China, Shangwubu Guojiatongjiju Guojiawaihuiguanliju Gongtong Juban
"Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Tongji Zhidu Sheli Shi Zhounian Ji 2011 Niandu Zhongguo Dui wai
Zhijie Touzi Tongji Gongbao Xinwen Fabuhui" (商务部 国家统计局 国家外汇管理局共
同举办“对外直接投资统计制度设立十周年暨《2011 年度中国对外直接投资统计公
报》新闻发布会) [PRC Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics of China,
and State Administration of Foreign Exchange jointly held "The Tenth Anniversary of
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March 2015, SASAC further announced that it will purchase third party
services from accounting firms through a bidding process to audit SOEs’
overseas assets.102 Enhancing supervision over SOEs’ overseas activities
has also become part of the government’s anti-corruption campaign. But
the monitoring effectiveness so far seems limited as SASAC’s resources
are unable to handle the scale and complexity of the SOE overseas
assets.103 Ironically, foreign investment reviews in host countries perhaps
may alleviate the agency problem to some extent by acting as an
additional mechanism to track SOE overseas operations and safeguard
state-owned assets from being squandered. Rather than simply viewing
foreign investment reviews as hostile, SASAC may take foreign
regulatory reviews as an opportunity to identify possible problems
associated with SOEs’ foreign operations.
C. Foreign Investment Regulations and Beyond
Foreign investment reviews can easily get politicized as the key
concepts (e.g. national interests and national security) in the regulations
are so loosely defined that they allow domestic interest parties to escalate
a business decision to a political controversy. The poor transparency of
Chinese SOEs further creates a convenient setting to play a politicization
drama. In the face of potential political challenges in the host country,
Chinese SOEs may use several strategies to avoid hostile encounters. For
instance, they may use chains of subsidiaries or even individual managers
as investment entities to hide their sensitive identities. These strategies
unfortunately make the governance of Chinese SOEs more obscure to
outsiders and increase agency and corruption problems. The host country
may lose economic benefits if the investment is killed in the politicalized
debate. At worst, it creates a vicious circle. To turn the vicious circle into
a virtuous one, Chinese SOEs should make efforts to improve their
governance quality. But it is also important for the host country to keep

Setting up Statistical Measures for the Direct Outward Investment & Press Conference on
Public Report on Chinese Direct Outward Investment Statistics for the year 2011”], (Aug.
31, 2012), http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/slfw/201208/20120808315863.shtml.
102
Guoyou Zhongdian Daxing Qiye Jianshihui 2015 Niandu Jizhong Zhongdian Jiancha
Xiangmu He Jingwai Guoyou ZichanJiancha Xiangmu Fuwu Caigou Zhaobiao Gonggao
(国有重点大型企业监事会 2015 年度集中重点检查项目和境外国有资产检查项目服
务采购招标公告) [Procurement and Tenders Notice for 2015 State-Owned Key Enterprise
Supervision Board’s Focused Inspection Items and Overseas State-Owned Assets
Inspection
Services
]
(promulgated
by
SASAC,
Mar.
17,
2015)
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85881/n85901/c1809041/content.html.
103
See Bingning Wang, supra note 83 (discussing the need for anti-corruption measures);
Bang An, supra note 83 (discussing the need for better monitoring of the SOEs).
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its regulatory review decisions based on rational deliberation of facts
rather than driven by irrational fear.104
Since the key concern of foreign SOE investment is that the
foreign government may interfere with the SOE management and extend
its tentacles to the invested entity in the host country, regulators in the host
country typically want to make sure the investing SOE can make
commitments to good corporate governance, which often means the
invested subsidiary should operate independently of its parent SOE. The
independence demand may limit positive influence diffused from the
subsidiary to the parent SOE. Nevertheless, given that positive flow-back
influence is likely elusive due to politics in the SOEs’ home country and
many other factors such as managerial incentives, the independence or
isolation policy is consistent with the host country’s interest, at least from
a short-term perspective.
Public controversies about Chinese SOEs’ international
investments often have been concentrated in the foreign investment review
process which acts a first-line safeguard against threats to the host
country’s national interests. But we should note that a vast majority of
foreign investments either pass regulatory screening or proceed without
triggering any regulatory scrutiny. 105 Therefore, the practical issue for
most foreign investments is about how foreign investors after entry in the
host country operate their business entities, including economic, social,
and environmental performance. This continuous exposure to foreign
institutional pressure is another potentially important source for
governance change. Thus, the question is how effectively the host country
monitors foreign investors’ on-going performance. For instance, it is
often believed that many Chinese SOEs use their overseas subsidiaries to
engage in corrupt activities.106 If a Chinese SOE uses its U.S. subsidiaries
to bribe “foreign officials” (including Chinese officials), it may incur
liability under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) where the
Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

104

See generally Zhang, supra note 25 (arguing that current foreign investment reviews
regarding Chinese SOE investments are often dominated by fear rather than based on
rational analysis).
105
Australian, Canadian, and U.S. regulators periodically publish the number of approved
and rejected applications. FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 20132014 (2015), http://www.firb.gov.au/content/publications.asp; INDUSTRY CANADA,
INVESTMENT CANADA ACT: QUARTERLY STATISTICS, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/icalic.nsf/eng/h_lk00015.html; COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR CY 2013 (2015), http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-reports.aspx.
106
See, e.g., Bingning Wang, supra note 83 (discussing the need for anti-corruption
measures).
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may jointly or separately initiate an FCPA investigation.107 And if the
Chinese SOE’s shares are registered in the United States, it is subject to
numerous continuous disclosure obligations under securities regulations.
The SEC used to have a virtually blank record of enforcement against
foreign issuers, but there seems a recent change in the enforcement
passivity.108 This sort of ongoing oversight may play a more important
role in protecting host countries’ interests and influencing foreign SOEs’
economic, social, and environmental practices than the entry screening of
foreign investment reviews. Host countries should not be so obsessed
with one-shot foreign investment reviews while being oblivious to a raft of
available regulatory tools that can protect their own interests on a
continuing basis.
VII.

Conclusion

This Article has tried to investigate whether internationalization
explains Chinese national champions’ governance reform patterns.
Preliminary empirical findings in this Article suggest that Chinese SOEs’
international investment activity appears virtually irrelevant to their
governance reform pace. It casts a shadow over the optimistic view that
international exposure would be an effective driving force to change the
SOEs’ governance practices. A complex combination of domestic politics,
investment motives, investment structure, and locations restrict the direct
linkage between internationalization and governance change. This Article
provides a better understanding of the complexity of governance change in
the age of globalization. It provides an innovative view for Chinese
regulators with regard to the value of foreign investment reviews in a host
country. It calls for a depoliticized decision-making process in foreign
investment regulatory regimes to create a virtuous circle for both investing
SOEs and host economies.
This early effort to understand the governance implications of
Chinese SOEs’ globalization raises important questions for future research.
Fundamentally, is globalizing Chinese SOEs desirable? The global
expansion of Chinese SOEs may have an effect of reversing China’s
privatization efforts over the past three decades. If internationalization
plays a limited role in the national champions’ governance reform pace,
what should be expected out of their global expansion? Are the globally
107

See ROBERT W. TARUN, BASICS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2006),
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub1287_1.pdf (providing an overview of the
FCPA).
108
See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively By Renting U.S.
Securities Laws? 75 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 335 (2005) (finding very little enforcement against
foreign issuers). But see Roger Nelson Silvers, SEC Enforcement of Foreign Firms: Is
Bonding Really a Myth? (Univ. of Mass., Working Paper, Feb. 2012) (noting an increase of
SEC enforcement against foreign issuers).
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growing SOEs crowding out private enterprises in the Chinese economy
and beyond? It should be noted that the recent phenomenon of globalizing
SOEs is not limited to China but many other economies such as Norway
and Malaysia where state capital plays an important role in allocating
resources. 109 Given that SOEs are closely connected with their home
countries’ economic and political institutions, an immediate question that
comes to mind is whether all SOEs are the same. Existing literature
provides sparse analysis on comparative SOE governance.110 There may
be a variety of SOEs across countries. Even within national borders,
diversity may exist. For instance, while preliminary evidence in this
Article suggests that the governance change of China’s central SOEs has
been largely unrelated to their degree of internationalization. It is
uncertain whether the empirical findings are equally applicable to
provincial or local SOEs in China. It has been proposed that local SOEs
are subject to less government prerogatives and are more marketoriented. 111 It requires future empirical research to confirm this
proposition. If it is true, then regulators should be sensitive to the
diversity of SOEs, rather them treating them all alike.

109

See Cuervo-Cazurra et al., supra note 86, at 919 (discussing the rise of state-owned
enterprises in international business).
110
There are only a few studies on comparing state capitalism and SOEs. See Aldo
Musacchio & Sérgio G Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and
Their Implications for Economic Performance, (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper, No. 12108, June 2012) (discussing the relationship between different state capitalism and SOEs);
Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
2917, 2917 (2012) (examining how government ownership in the United States, Brazil,
China, and Europe may make corporate law design less desirable for private companies).
111
See Ming Hua Li et al., Varieties in State Capitalism: Outward FDI Strategies of
Central and Local State-Owned Enterprises from Emerging Economy Countries, 45 J.
INT’L BUS. STUD. 980, 980 (2014) (discussing how local SOEs are subject to less
governmental pressure and display greater market orientation).
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